spaces of freedom in early modern feminist thought
'Intimate Liberties' unearths the ways in which proto-feminist thinkers in the seventeenth century defined the principles and practices of liberty through an examination of four sites of debate: the convent, the home, the school, and the courts. It focuses on the relationship between liberty and resistance and how, for most of the figures whose works I examine, to claim their liberty is simultaneously an act of refusal - a refusal of social expectations, of norms, and of the law. I am particularly interested in how these discourses of freedom are operationalized with respect to the body and to spatial practices. Though the archive of materials I work with is several centuries old, the project is motivated by twenty-first century concerns about bodily autonomy, freedom, and Foucauldian technologies of the self.
The project possesses three goals. First, I aim to expand the scope of liberty as it is conventionally understood in early modern thought, by attending to voices often excluded from the public sphere. Second, I explore the ways in which freedom has functioned not only an abstract principle but as a lived experience pursued by those ostensibly excluded from its enjoyment. This entails examining what Henri Lefebvre calls “the social production of space,” and the ways in which physical space shapes, and is in turn conditioned by, different understandings of liberty. The third goal draws on the work of Elizabeth Grosz and Luce Irgiray. I examine the ways in which discourses about women’s freedom are often couched in a rhetoric of embodiment, specifically in discussions of sex-segregated sanctuaries (living without the presence of men) and physical autonomy (refusing men access to women’s bodies).
The first paper from this project is titled 'Freedom, Bondage, and Gender in Milton’s Divorce Tracts.' Though historians of political thought have taken interest in Milton as a republican thinker, few have considered the relationship of his republicanism to his writings on divorce, or the implications of his writings on divorce for his understanding of liberty. I argue that the divorce tracts ought to be read as a reflection of Milton’s increasing commitment to republican values, particularly liberty. I begin by distinguishing between Milton’s use of a rhetoric of bondage on the one hand and a rhetoric of slavery of the other, and their shared inverse, freedom, as Milton employs them to depict the unhappy marital union.
I then analyze the ways in which Milton describes bondage and liberty as possessing particular spatial associations. Focusing on the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, I demonstrate that Milton associates bondage with the home and the ‘mariage-bed,’ and depicts the public sphere as a potential site of liberty. I argue that this combination of rhetoric and imagery casts Milton’s argument in a specifically republican, rather than liberal, light. To that end, I conclude by reading the Doctrine’s interpellation of the domestic and the public against the tendency in the republican tradition to reify the realms as distinct and self-sufficient, and suggest that Milton refuses what I call the Roman model of public and private while still maintaining a republican attitude toward freedom.
A second essay is titled 'Mary Astell, Recluses, and the Politics of Refusal.' Established interpretations of Astell’s work focus on the tensions between her conservatism and her avant la lettre feminism. This paper offers an alternative interpretive framework and argues in favor of reading Astell as a theorist of refusal. I focus on two dimensions of Astell’s life and work: her under-appreciated comments on the choice to remain unmarried and her supposed reclusiveness toward the end of her life. With regard to marriage, I examine Astell’s commentary on the infamous divorce of the Duke and Duchess of Marazin found in Some Reflections upon Marriage (1706). There Astell argues that women who chose to marry put themselves in a position of subservience that they were bound to maintain. Yet little attention has been paid to the caveat made by Astell: a woman could also choose not to marry.
I offer an extended consideration of the ways in which Astell’s own life - specifically, her own choice not to marry and her refusal to entertain visitors in her last days - echoed her philosophical positions. Thus I recast the notion of Astell as reclusive. Instead, I posit that her reclusiveness, long practiced by female intellectuals including Julian of Norwich and disputed by others such as Arcangela Tarabotti, ought to be interpreted as an act of refusal. I argue that while the choice to inhabit certain spaces has frequently been conditioned by patriarchal authority, it has also been a way for women to refuse social expectations, most of all marriage. Astell’s purported reclusiveness can thus be read as a politically powerful example of refusal as liberty.